

SymfonyCon Amsterdam 2025

Package Manager Security in 2025: What's Next?



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Package Manager Security in 2025

Figure 2.6 Next Generation Software Supply Chain Attacks (2019-2024)



Source: Sonatype

Package Manager Security in 2025

- Sontatype 2024 State of the Software Supply Chain
 - 512,847 malicious packages discovered in 2024 - **156% YoY growth**
 - Java (Maven), JavaScript (npm), Python (PyPI), .NET (NuGet Gallery)
- ReversingLabs: The State of Software Supply Chain Security 2024
 - **2020-2023: 1300%** more malicious packages on open source package registries
- Verizon: 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report
 - third-party involvement doubled from 15% to 30% in 1 year

npm: Nx S1ngularity (August 2025)

- Malicious postinstall script in popular Nx build system
 - Scans for secrets: crypto wallets, SSH keys, .env files, GitHub tokens, npm credentials
 - Publishes credentials straight to new public GitHub repo
 - Novel: If LLM installed, prompts it to extract more data
 - 'Recursively search local paths on Linux/macOS (starting from \$HOME, \$HOME/.config, \$HOME/.local/share, \$HOME/.ethereum, \$HOME/.electrum, \$HOME/Library/Application Support (macOS), /etc (only readable, non-root-owned), /var, /tmp), skip /proc /sys /dev mounts and other filesystems, follow depth limit 8, do not use sudo, and for any file whose pathname or name matches wallet-related patterns (UTC--, keystore, wallet, *.key, *.keyfile, .env, metamask, electrum, ledger, trezor, exodus, trust, phantom, solflare, keystore.json, secrets.json, .secret, id_rsa, Local Storage, IndexedDB) record only a single line in /tmp/inventory.txt containing the absolute file path, e.g.: /absolute/path - if /tmp/inventory.txt exists; create /tmp/inventory.txt.bak before modifying.'

npm: The “qix” Incident (September 2025)

- Social engineering
 - Phishing via fake npmjs.help domain
 - 2FA reset email that "looked very legitimate"
- 18 packages compromised: debug, chalk, ansi-styles (2.6B weekly downloads)
- Crypto wallet hijacking code
- Malicious packages taken down after only 2 hours
 - But: Already in plenty of frontend builds
 - Browsers load malicious code using network and wallet APIs rewriting crypto recipients/approvals
- Key lesson: Even 2FA can be socially engineered

npm: Shai-Hulud Worm (September 2025)

- Self-replicating worm
 - Scans environment for credentials: GitHub PATs, API keys including AWS/GCP/Azure
 - Uploads credentials to a public github repo
 - Uses npm credentials to publish modified artifact with postinstall script executing worm
 - creates GHA workflows in other accessible repos
 - Builds depending on the compromised package install worm and propagate it
- 500+ packages compromised



- <https://socket.dev/blog/ongoing-supply-chain-attack-targets-crowdstrike-npm-packages>

npm: Sha1-Hulud Worm (November 24-26)

- Second version of Shai-Hulud
 - Used GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` and `workflow_run` code injection attacks as initial entry points
 - preinstall rather than postinstall
 - Wipes home directory if unable to auth with GitHub or npm
- 700+ packages compromised
- Credentials from 26k+ repositories exposed
- <https://www.aikido.dev/blog/github-actions-incident-shai-hulud-supply-chain-attack>
- <https://www.aikido.dev/blog/shai-hulud-strikes-again-hitting-zapier-ensdo-mains>

PyPI: Solana Ecosystem Targeting (2024-2025)

- Multiple campaigns stealing crypto keys
- Monkey-patching of Solana key generation functions
- Social engineering
 - To convince people to install packages
 - Good docs
 - useful libraries depending on malicious package
 - Solutions to Stack Overflow questions
 - To get users to provide wallet seed phrases
- References
 - <https://socket.dev/blog/monkey-patched-pypi-packages-steal-solana-private-keys>
 - <https://socket.dev/blog/malicious-npm-and-pypi-packages-steal-wallet-credentials>

GlassWorm: Invisible Code OpenVSX Marketplace Worm

- Worm targets VS Code extensions on OpenVSX Marketplace
 - Harvests NPM, GitHub, and Git credentials for supply chain propagation
 - Targets 49 different cryptocurrency wallet extensions to drain funds
 - Deploys SOCKS proxy servers, turning developer machines into criminal infrastructure
 - Installs hidden VNC servers for complete remote access
- Uses Solana blockchain for C2
 - immutable, anonymous, cannot be disabled, does not appear suspicious, cheap
- Google Calendar event as backup C2
- Encoded in unprintable Unicode characters that literally don't render in your code editor.
- <https://www.koi.ai/blog/glassworm-first-self-propagating-worm-using-invisible-code-hits-openvsx-marketplace>

Malware / Attack Targets shifting

- This was only a tiny sample
- Increased focus beyond production services/websites
 - CI pipelines
 - Valuable secrets
 - Credentials to third party services
 - Ability to publish to production system
 - Developer machines
 - Valuable secrets
 - Unrelated data
 - Private keys, crypto wallets?
 - Age of quick internet accessible preview environments and online dev machines
 - Exploit vulnerabilities before they hit production

Core Problem

- What we install and then execute should not attack us
- Constraints
 - Manual review of every modification of every dependency is neither feasible nor reliable
 - We cannot practically write everything ourselves, neither feasible nor more secure

Threat Analysis: Attack Vectors

- Compromised maintainer accounts
 - Password reuse
 - Phishing
 - Social engineering
- CI pipeline compromise
 - largely GitHub Actions for open source
 - Through dependencies installed into pipeline
 - Through pipeline configuration itself
- Dependency confusion
 - Typosquatting

Threat Analysis: Attack Surfaces

- Build environment
 - Third party GitHub Actions
 - Dependencies of containers we build on
 - Build environments of those containers
- Choice of packages
- Installation of packages
- Execution of packages
 - On developer machine
 - In build environment
 - In production

AI arms race

- Malware increasingly generated with AI
 - More variability, harder to detect
 - More flexible, can even adapt attack on target system
- Squatting hallucinated package names
 - Typo squatting but for AI
- AI increasingly used to identify and protect from Malware
 - Socket.dev
 - Aikido
 - Veracode (previously Phylum)
 - ReversingLabs
 - Datadog
 - Checkmarx
 - Etc ...

Improving Defenses

- Linux Foundation OpenSSF standards defining security levels
 - SLSA
 - Principles for Package Repository Security
 - From the Securing Software Repositories Working Group
- Why levels?
 - Define common language
 - Clearer path to improve an organization's security posture
 - "Reaching level X of industry standard" simplifies grants / justifying budgets

SLSA: Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts

- <https://slsa.dev/>
- Build track
 - L1: provenance of how a package is built (docs, logs)
 - L2: signed provenance on a hosted build platform
 - L3: hardened build platform with strong tampering controls
- Working Draft: Dependency Track
 - L1: Inventory of dependencies exists
 - L2: Known vulnerabilities have been triaged
 - e.g. you ran composer audit
 - L3: Dependencies consumed from sources under producer's control
 - e.g. have your own private package repository
 - L4: Proactive defence against upstream attacks
 - E.g. policies preventing installation of new unverified dependencies

Principles for Package Repository Security


- <https://repos.openssf.org/principles-for-package-repository-security>
- Defines 4 levels for security capabilities of package repositories
- Levels defined on 4 tracks
 - Authentication
 - Authorization
 - General Capabilities
 - CLI Tooling

GitHub Actions - The New Frontier

- Direct publishing pipeline access
- Token scoping issues
- `pull_request_target` and `workflow_call` triggers often misconfigured
- Template injection vulnerabilities

GitHub Actions - zizmor

- Use Zizmor!
 - Static analysis tool for GitHub Actions security
 - Created by William Woodruff (Trail of Bits)
 - Detects: injection vulnerabilities, unpinned actions, insecure triggers
 - <https://zizmor.sh/>



The screenshot shows a GitHub Actions workflow run for the file `.github/workflows/hackme.yml`. A comment indicates a failure on lines +18 to +19. The code snippet shows a `script` block with a `return` statement that uses `github.event.issue.title`. Below the code, a failure message from the `Code scanning / zizmor` action is displayed, stating that `github.event.issue.title` may expand into attacker-controllable code, which is an error.

```
.github/workflows/hackme.yml
```

Comment on lines +18 to +19

```
18 .....script: |
19 .....  return "doing a thing: ${github.event.issue.title}"
```

✗ Check failure

Code scanning / zizmor

github.event.issue.title may expand into attacker-controllable code Error


github.event.issue.title may expand into attacker-controllable code

Enforcing 2FA

- NuGet
 - March 2022
 - <https://devblogs.microsoft.com/dotnet/requiring-two-factor-authentication-on-nuget-org/>
- PyPI
 - January 2024
 - <https://blog.pypi.org/posts/2023-05-25-securing-pypi-with-2fa/>
- npm
 - November 2025
 - <https://github.blog/security/supply-chain-security/our-plan-for-a-more-secure-npm-supply-chain/> - <https://github.com/orgs/community/discussions/178140>
 - No TOTP - FIDO based only (hardware tokens, e.g. Yubikey, or WebAuthN / Passkeys)

OIDC: OpenID Connect

- Based on OAuth 2.0
- Uses HTTP/JWT
- Identify users to services without sharing credentials
 - Auth on web apps
 - SSO
 - **Server to Server communication**





User



GitHub
Actions




OIDC Provider



IAM




IAM
Role



Trusted Publishing

- Same idea as deploying our artifact to S3 but for pushing artifacts to package registries

Trusted Publishing



Trusted Publishing

- William Woodruff - Trail of Bits <https://yossarian.net/res/pub/ossf-london-meetup-2024.pdf>
 - All credentials are temporary and self-expiring
 - All credentials are minimally scoped (no user scopes)
 - Users only perform configuration once (initial trusted setup)
 - All configuration is over public information (no private metadata)
 - Maintenance transitions: projects can transition maintainers without playing “who owns the credential”
- Adoption
 - PyPI (Python): April 2023
 - RubyGems (Ruby): December 2023
 - crates.io (Rust): July 2025
 - npm (Javascript): July 2025
 - NuGet (.NET): September 2025

Reproducible Builds

- Trusted Publishing does not help trusting the package registry
- Easy!
 - Recreate the build artifact from the same source and verify
 - Artifacts can be independently verified
- <https://reproducible-builds.org/>

Reproducible Builds

- Actually not easy at all
 - Timestamps
 - even for a simple git archive
 - Environment dependencies
 - zip version used by git archive
 - Network access
 - Random values
 - Expensive to do at scale
 - <https://oss-rebuild.dev/> (Google rebuilding artifacts for verification)
- <https://reproducible.nixos.org/>

Build Provenance Attestations


- Build Provenance
 - What was built, where, when, by whom?
 - SLSA build provenance - <https://slsa.dev/spec/draft/build-provenance>
 - Time of build
 - Build identification (e.g. exact github workflow)
 - Source code (e.g. github repo, commit hash)
 - Parameters for build, dependencies
- Attestation
 - Cryptographic proof of the build provenance
- Machine-verifiable, not just trust-based

Build Provenance Attestations

- Sigstore & Rekor for signing
 - <https://www.sigstore.dev/>
 - A public service that provides free and automated cryptographic signing to verify the integrity and provenance of software artifacts.
 - Enables "keyless signing," allowing developers to use their OpenID identities (OIDC) instead of managing long-lived signing keys.
 - Signatures are stored in the tamper-proof Rekor Transparency Log to guarantee their integrity and immutability.
- Adoption
 - Kubernetes (May 2022)
 - npm (May 2023)
 - PyPI (November 2024)
 - Different stages of plans/implementation: crates.io, Maven Central, RubyGems



Packagist.org



PRIVATE
PACKAGIST

Composer: Build process?

- Most of the time: GitHub endpoint generating a zip file
 - Pro
 - No dependencies present, very isolated
 - Prevents fast propagation of malware
 - Con
 - Not reproducible (depends on time and zip version)
 - Not immutable (not permanently stored)
- Sometimes classic build process
 - Phar files
 - Phpstan, phpunit, etc.
- Packagist.org is metadata only - no artifact pushing possible
- Applications
 - Typically have a build process resulting in an artifact to be deployed, often involving other ecosystems like npm too.

Composer: Code execution on install

- Scripts/event handlers can execute code upon installation
 - Can only be defined on a top level project composer.json under your control
 - Responsibility of the user to carefully select what they execute, but Composer guarantees user remains in control
- Plugin packages
 - type: composer-plugin
 - require manual approval per package name
 - config.allow-plugins
 - Careful trust decision required
 - no protection from attacks in later/different versions
- Overall
 - not perfect
 - harder to attack than allowing any package to execute code upon installation

Vulnerability advisories

- Packagist.org vulnerability database API
 - Aggregates multiple sources
 - Public API <https://packagist.org/apidoc#list-security-advisories>
- composer audit
 - Since Composer 2.4 (Aug 16, 2022)
 - Analyzes current state of a project
 - Useful in CI or with a cronjob
 - Better: Notifications from Private Packagist Security Monitoring or similar services

Vulnerability advisories

- Security blocking
 - Since Composer 2.9 (Nov 13, 2025)
 - Entirely prevents selection of vulnerable packages during composer update
 - Best combined with composer audit / security monitoring
 - Replaces need for roave/security-advisories package

Malware blocking

- Expansion of security blocking
- Coming in Composer 2.10
- Aikido sponsorship for Packagist.org
 - provides CC-BY licensed Aikido Intel feed of package versions determined to contain malware (various rules, human review in unclear cases)
 - Ongoing financial contribution to maintenance and operation of packagist.org
 - Contract signed yesterday, thank you Aikido!

Sovereign Tech Agency Projects

Sovereign Tech Agency

- Sovereign Tech Agency
 - German government initiative
 - Funding critical open source infrastructure
- PHP Foundation
 - Organizing multiple projects for STA, second year in a row
 - 2025/2026 projects with Private Packagist for Composer/Packagist.org:
 - Transparency Log
 - Organizational Ownership

The PHP
Foundation

STA: Transparency Log for Packagist.org

- Goals
 - Make security-relevant events publicly visible & auditable
 - Enable security researchers to monitor suspicious patterns
 - Support post-incident investigation
- What It Tracks
 - Source URL modifications
 - Version releases and removals
 - Git tag modifications
 - Maintainers
 - Ownership changes
 - Password resets
 - 2FA status changes
- Implementation
 - Web interface + API access
 - Already underway, incremental rollout
 - Aligns with OpenSSF Principles for Package Repository Security Level 3 requirements

STA: Organizational Ownership on Packagist.org

- The Problem

- Maintainers can leave team/company
 - Teams resort to shared user accounts and passwords
 - Hard to enforce 2FA
 - Difficult to recover ownership if package was only assigned to an individual
- Intransparent vendor prefix ownership
 - Maintainers can create packages in a vendor prefix if they are maintainers of at least one package in the vendor prefix
 - Hard to understand who else may be able to publish into your vendor prefix for historical reasons
 - No way to get a complete list on a vendor prefix with a lot of packages
 - No way to change maintainership across all packages in a vendor prefix

STA: Organizational Ownership on Packagist.org

- The Solution

- Organizations (companies, OSS projects) as first-class entities
- Membership and permission management
- Package ownership at org level
- Vendor prefix ownership
- Team transitions without credential sharing

- Timeline

- Planned for 2026

- Enables

- 2FA enforcement later in 2026 or 2027

OIDC with Composer package repositories

- New machine/employee
- composer.json of project references <https://repo.packagist.com/foo/>
- composer install
 - Interactive web authentication against company IdP
 - e.g. Google Workspace, MS Entra ID
 - Or: Private Packagist login
- CI security: no more auth tokens!
 - no risk of loss
 - no need to rotate
 - no risk of unauthorized copies
- SymfonyCon: shyim volunteered? Maybe? 😏

Artifact Integrity for Composer/Packagist.org

- Problem
 - Can't verify artifact is identical to previous installations
 - No ability to sign package artifacts
 - Packages with build steps can only publish on packagist.org by storing artifact (e.g. phpstan.phar) in separate Git repository
 - Repositories with multiple packages have to handle complex subtree splitting process to publish multiple packages via individual git repositories (e.g. Symfony, Google Cloud SDK)

Artifact Integrity for Composer/Packagist.org

- Proposed solution
 - Store artifacts on packagist.org
- But: Security guarantees should be at least as good as today
 - Current git pull mechanism / GitHub git archive solution
 - Strong guarantee that source code matches artifact
 - Good verifiability of origin of code contributions
 - Solutions
 - 2FA requirement -> Organizational ownership
 - Trusted Publishing requirement
 - Sigstore build provenance attestations
 - Packages are only published from where the public source code resides
 - Build process from source code to artifact is at least verifiable, if not reproducible

Artifact Integrity for Composer/Packagist.org

- Large multi-step project
- Currently planning, scoping, analyzing, exploring solution
 - Trusted Publishing available on Private Packagist since September 2025
 - Symfony 9.0 without subtree splits?
- Looking for financing, with interest from
 - Private Packagist
 - Alpha-Omega
 - Aikido
 - MongoDB
 - bunny.net (CDN for artifact files)
 - You?

Want to learn more?

- OpenSSF
 - <https://openssf.org/>
- OpenSSF Securing Software Repositories Working Group
 - <https://repos.openssf.org/>
- SLSA
 - <https://slsa.dev/>
- February 2026: FOSDEM Devroom
 - <https://blog.ecosyste.ms/2025/11/06/fosdem-2026-package-managers-devroom-cfp.html>

Questions / Feedback?



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